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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 77B-PROPERTY OF THE DEBToR.-
The debtor, a steamship company, had purchased seven steel cargo vessels from
the United States in 1928. The company paid part of price at the time of pur-
chase and agreed to pay the balance over a period of years. In 1929 the com-
pany contracted with the United States Shipping Board to carry ocean mail. In
1933 the company defaulted on the payment of installments. The Board arranged
to credit the amounts due for carrying to the unpaid purchase price. In January
1936 the company filed a petition for reorganization under Section 77B in the
bankruptcy court in the Western District of Washington. The petition was
approved on the same day and the debtor was authorized to carry on its busi-
ness. The Secretary of Commerce notified the debtor that the credit arrange-
ment of the Shipping Board had been rescinded. Before filing the petition the
debtor had notified the Post Office Department that certain voyages had been
completed. The debtor had demanded two sums each one over $14,000. The gov-
ernment officials refused to pay. The debtor then filed a petition setting out the
above facts and alleged that it must have the sums due on the 1935 contracts if
it was to continue in business. At the same time an order to show cause was
entered directing the sums to be paid or that the United States and certain
government officials appear before the court and show cause why the payments
should not be made. Special motions were filed by the United States and by the
officials concerned in which they objected to the jurisdiction of the court and in
which the individuals contended that they had never been served with process
in the particular district. The bankruptcy court denied the motion of the United
States to dismiss and directed all the defendants except the United States to pay
the accrued and the future earnings under the contract. On appeal, by leave of
the bankruptcy court, held, order reversed and the bankruptcy court ordered to
dismiss the petition against the United States and to set aside the service upon
the individuals; the claim to the fund already appropriated but still to be paid
out is not "property" of the debtor. United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co.,
86 F. (2d) 363 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936).
Under Section 77B (a) the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (a)
(1936). In Continental Bank v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 Sup.
Ct. 595, 79 L.ed. 1110 (1935) the Supreme Court held that a similar provision
in Section 77 [47 STAT. 1474, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205 (a) (1933)] gave the bank-
ruptcy court with which the petition had been filed power to enjoin the sale
of pledged collaterals belonging to the debtor and held by creditors who resided
outside the district and who had not voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. In a proceeding under Section 77B the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Second Circuit upheld the power of the bankruptcy court in a New York
district to order a receiver appointed by a court in Georgia for properties
located in that state to turn those properties over to the trustees appointed for
the debtor by the New York bankruptcy court. In re Greyling Realty Corpora-
tion, 74 F. (2d) 734 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935). The court pointed out in that case
that the bankruptcy court must order notice of the hearing to be served in some
manner which will insure adequate protection to the party summoned. See also
In re Midland United Co., 12 F. Supp. 502 (D. Del. 1935); In re Norfolk
Weavers, 12 F. Supp. 494 (D. Del. 1935). The bankruptcy court in the Western
District of New York directed service to be made by trustees appointed for a
debtor in a 77B proceeding upon former directors and stockholders of the
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debtor then resident in Michigan in an "independent suit" to recover misappro-
priated moneys, and the court denied the motions of the "defendants" to quash
the service. Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1935). The court
in the instant case did not approve of the decision in Thomas v. Winslow, supra.
The court in the principal case pointed out that the debtor or the debtor's trus-
tees might have to proceed by way of a plenary suit against adverse parties and
that the provision in Section 77B about jurisdiction would not help the primary
court in those cases. The court felt that the obligation in this particular case
was contractual even though the appropriation had been authorized.
In no one of these cases on jurisdiction under Section 77B was the question
of sanction considered. In the Rock Island case there was sanction behind the
order of the court in that the holders of the collaterals without further protest
would have to accept their position in the reorganization plan which the bank-
ruptcy court might confirm. But in a case like In re Greyling Realty Corporation,
supra, if the Georgia receiver would refuse to obey the order of the New York
bankruptcy court it would seem that any process such as citation and imprison-
ment for contempt would have to issue out of the Georgia federal court as an
ancillary bankruptcy court. The district in whih the petition has been filed
may not be that in which the reorganization can best be supervised but it is
with the discretion of that court if it has approved the petition to retain or
relinquish supervision providing of course that the debtor had its principal place
of business or its principal assets in the particular district during the greater part
of the preceding six months or was incorporated in the state of which the dis-
trict is a part. Hamilton Gas Co. v. Wafters, 75 F. (2d) 176 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935)
(where the creditors had filed a petition in one district and where the debtor
had filed a petition in another district in which the petition was first approved
and where the court held that the debtor may choose the district providing it
is one of those covered by the general jurisdiction provisions of the statute) ;
In re Hamilton Gas Co., 79 F. (2d) 97 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) (involving the same
debtor and where the appellate court directed the court which had first approved
the petition to dismiss the proceding because the debtor had neither its principal
place of business nor its principal assets in the particular district for the greater
part of the six month period preceding the filing of the petition) ; Hamilton Gas
Co. v .Watters, 79 F. (2d) 438 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935) (involving the same debtor
and where the appellate court affirmed the order approving the petition by that
court in which the creditors had first filed); see also In re Kelly-Springfield
Tire Co., 11 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); cf. § 32 of the Bankruptcy Act,
'30 STAT. 554 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 55 (1926), and § 77B (a), supra ("* * * The
court shall upon petition transfer such proceedings to the territorial jurisdiction
where the interests of the parties will best be subserved. * * *).
VERNON X. MILLER.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FAIR TRADE ACT-RIGHT OF THE MANUFACTURER,
WHOLESALER, OR PRODUCER TO CONTROL THE RESALE PRICE OF TRADEMARKED OR
BRANDED CoMlMODITIEs.-These are two suits brought to enjoin the defendant
retailers from offering for sale and selling certain trademarked and branded
goods at less than the price fixed by the plaintiff wholesalers. The facts in the
two actions are similar. The State of Illinois has adopted the so-called Fair
Trade Act which, in effect, authorizes the producer, wholesaler, or manufacturer
of a trademarked or branded commodity which is in fair and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced by others to enter into
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a contract with the buyer of such a commodity which contract may provide:
"(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipu-
lated by the vendor; (2) That the producer or vendee of a commodity require
upon the sale of such commodity to another, that such purchaser agree that he
will not, in turn, resell except at the price stipulated by such producer or
vendee." Section 2 of this Act provides: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in
any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of this Act,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a
party to such contract ,is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby." ILL. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 121Y2 § 188 et seq.;
ILL. REv. STAT. (1935) c. 140, § 8 et seq. The plaintiff is a wholesale dealer in
alcoholic beverages, and it buys certain branded and trademarked whiskies from
producers; the whiskies in question are in fair and open competition with goods
of the same general class manufactured by others. Defendant corporation oper-
ates retail liquor stores in the city of Chicago. The plaintiff has never sold its
products to the defendant, nor has there ever been any contractural relation
between the two parties. But plaintiff has sold its whiskies to other wholesalers
in Chicago and has entered into price-fixing contracts with them pursuant to the
above Act. There is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the defendant
had knowledge of the price fixed in these contracts, but wilfully sold the trade-
marked whiskies in question at a price below that fixed by the plaintiff. Plain-
tiff shows as injury a diminution in its sales and that other retailers have
threatened to discontinue the plaintiff's product unless the price-cutting practice
of the defendant is stopped. Decrees for the plaintiffs in both cases. The decrees
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Joseph Triner Corp v. McNeil,
363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E. (2d) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435 (1936) ; Seagran-Distillers Corp.
v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E. (2d) 940 (1936). On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, decrees affirmed. The price-fixing pro-
visions of the Fair Trade Act is not a violation of the due-process clause, nor
of the equal-protection clause of the Constitution. U. S. CoxsT. Amend. 14, § 1.
The essence of the Act is to protect the property of the producer in trade-
marked goods, that is, the good will which the public holds toward his product.
Further, there is no denial of the equal protection of the laws because the
branded goods affected by the Act must be in free and open competition with
other goods of the same general nature produced by others. Old Dearborn Dis-
tributing Co-mpany v. Seagrain-Distillers Corp.; McNeil v. Joseph Triner Corp.,
57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
At common law the right of the producer of branded or trademarked goods,
which are in free and open competition with goods of similar nature manufactured
and sold by others, to contract with his vendee in regard to a fixed resale price
of such goods has never been denied, but the producer's remedy against a
retailer who cut the price of his commodity was given solely upon the con-
tract. Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909) (wherein a contract
fixing the price of branded olive oil was upheld); D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hm-
sicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912) (wherein a notice upon a package of
branded ground chocolate to the effect that the same was accepted by the whole-
saler or retailer on the express condition that he would not sell it at a price
lower than there stipulated was construed as a contract and enforced against
a retailer who had not bought directly from the plaintiff but from a wholesaler) ;
Fischer Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913)
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(wherein a contract fixing the resale price of branded flour was construed as
ancillary to the contract of sale and was enforced against the defendant ven-
dee). The reason for the rule is stated to be the protection of the manufacturer
who is injured by the retailer's action in cutting prices while the retailer suffers
no loss thereby because he may recoup such loss by the increase in sales caused
by the cut price. Fischer Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 668, 137
Pac. 144, 151 (1913). However, the right to fix the resale price by contract does
not extend to patented articles or to articles manufactured under a secret for-
mula because in those cases the field of competition is clearly limited to those
persons handling that particular article. Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene, 202 Fed.
225 (S.D. N.Y. 1913), affirmed, 232 U.S. 724 (1913); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 58 L.ed. 192 (1910).
Now, the proposition to be considered is: where the manufacturer, wholesaler,
or producer of trademarked or branded goods, which are in fair and open com-
petition with similar articles manufactured by others, has a contract or a series
of contracts with the purchasers of such articles which contracts fix the resale
price of the goods, may he, by the very fact that the articles are trademarked
or branded, enforce such price regulation against a retailer who handles his
article, cuts the price, but who has no contractural relation with him? Before
the enactment of the Fair Trade Act in various jurisdictions the answer to this
question was in the negative. The manufacturer, wholesaler, or producer of
trademarked or branded goods cannot, without statutory aid, control the resale
price of such articles in the hands of a retailer with whom he has no con-
tractual connection. Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Department Stores, Inc., 284 N.Y. Supp.
909, 926 (1935). However, a manufacturer could always refuse to sell his prod-
uct to a retailer who cut prices. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
39 Sup. Ct. 465, 63 L.ed. 992 (1919) ; State of Washington v. C. B. Scallard, 126
Wash. 335, 218 Pac. 224 (1923). But cf. Federal Trade Cowmm. v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 Sup. Ct. 150, 66 L.ed. 307 (1921).
For many years it has been the policy of government to promote free com-
petition by enacting laws preventing the formation of trusts and monopolies, the
so-called anti-trust laws of the various state and Federal governments. Joseph
Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 I1. 559, 2 N.E. (2d) 929 (1936). But various states,
including New York, California, New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin, have
recently deemed it wise to modify such policy, and so they have enacted Fair
Trade Acts. California: Laws (1931) p. 583, amended, Laws (1933) p. 793; Illi-
nois: ILL. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 121V, § 188; New Jersey: N. J. ANN.
STAT. 1935, §§ 217-13 to 217-17; New York: Laws (1935) c. 976; Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. (1935) § 133.25. The economic theory behind the Acts has been stated
to be the protection of the manufacturer's property right in the goodwill towards
his product which has been produced and kept by never selling the article
below a stipulated price, and it has been declared sound policy to protect that
property right against destruction by others whose only interest in such right
is to use it to deceive the public. Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, supra. The
Wisconsin Legislature has stated the intent of the act to be the safeguarding
of the public "against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster
and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices
under which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented." Wis. STAT.
(1935) § 133.27. The California Supreme Court has declared in favor of the
policy of the Act, that price cutting in time will adversely affect public interest,
and that the public will be adequately protected against unreasonable prices
[Vol. 21
RECENT DECISIONS
because the Act does not prevent fair and open competition between manufac-
turers of similar products. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55
P. (2d) 177 (1936), aff'd. under the doctrine of the principal case, 57 Sup. Ct.
147 (1936). The Fair Trade Act, in effect, permits the manufacturer, wholesaler,
or producer of trademarked or branded articles to control the resale price of
such goods in the hands of a retailer with whom he has no contractual rela-
tion; it further permits such manufacturer a remedy against such retailer for
his cutting of the stipulated resale price. So, clearly, the Fair Trade Act is a
legislative choice of economic policy. The courts have plainly indicated that it
is a legislative and not a judicial function to make such a choice of policy,
and that the only purpose of judicial review is to determine whether the sub-
ject of the legislation is within the power of the state to act upon, and if it is,
whether the means adopted to promote such policy are constitutional. Max Fac-
tor & Co. v. Kunsman, supra; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup Ct.
505, 78 L.ed. 940 (1933) ; Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Department Stores, Inc., 284 N.Y.
Supp. 914 (1935). The Act has been attacked in various jurisdictions on five
constitutional grounds; they are: (1) that the Act is an unconstitutional attempt
to regulate interstate commerce; (2) that the statute is so indefinite, vague, and
incomplete that a person of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning, and
it is therefore unconstitutional as being a denial of due process; (3) the Act,
in that it allows a private individual to fix the price by contract, is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power to such individual in violation of the state con-
stitution granting such power to the legislature; (4) the Act is a denial to
the owner of property of the equal protection of the law in that it is arbitrary
and unreasonable in its classification; (5) the Act is a violation of the due-
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because every
owner of property has the right to determine for himself at what price he will
sell it. Because the Fair Trade Act, at best, can only be construed as applying
to transactions within the state where passed, the first objection that the Act
is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate interstate commerce fails. Max Factor
& Co. v. Kunnnan, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P. (2d) 177, 197 (1936). The second
objection that the statute is indefinite, vague, uncertain and incomplete and that
a person of ordinary intelligence would be compelled to guess at its meaning and
that therefore the Act is a denial of due process has been disposed of in the
instant case, both in the state court of last resort and in the United States
Supreme Court on appeal, as being of no value; the Illinois Court said that
when the general phrases used have a technical or special meaning well enough
known "to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them," then the
Act is sufficiently certain. Joseph Triner Corp v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E. (2d)
929, 939 (1936). The third objection that allowing a private individual the right
to fix prices is an unlawful delegation of the legislative power and that there-
fore the Act is contrary to the state constitution which vests such power in the
legislature is of considerable weight. The New York Supreme Court seized
upon this argument to declare the New York Fair Trade Act invalid. Coty, Inc.
v. Hearn Department Stores, Inc., supra. The New Jersey Court of Chancery
follows the reasoning in the Coty case and declares its Fair Trade Act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority to individuals without definite policy and rule of action. Johnson &
Johnson v. Weissbard, (N.J. 1936) 184 Atl. 783. The New York Court of
Appeals apparently affirms this doctrine in a later case, saying further that the
articles there in question (books) were not affected with a public interest and
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that therefore even the legislature would not have the power to fix the prices
of these commodities much less delegate such power to a private individual.
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., 269 N.Y. 272, 199
N.E. 409 (1936). The Illinois court attempts to distinguish the Doubleday,
Doran case on the ground that the books there in question were not "commodi-
ties" within the meaning of the Act. Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill.
559, 2 N.E. (2d) 929, 936 (1936). But the distinction is evidently of no value,
because the New York Court of Appeals reaffirms its stand in a later case
apparently dealing with a different class of goods. Seeck & Kade v. Tomshinsky,
269 N.Y. 613, 200 N.E. 23 (1936). The California court sustains the Fair Trade
Act in its authorization of price-fixing contracts on the ground that such pro-
vision may be authorized under the police power of the state, saying that such
power is not limited to the protection of life, safety, health and morals of its
citizens, but that such power may extend to the promotion of public convenience
and general prosperity; that therefore state legislation may authorize control
of the resale price of commodities, even though such goods are not affected
with a public interest, if the trade practice involved interferes with public con-
venience and general prosperity. The court distinguishes the Doubleday, Doran
case on three grounds: (1) that the contract fixing the price in that case was
betveen the producer and its subsidiary, "a contract between themselves;" (2)
that the producer there was not obliged to sell to the defendant retailer, but
that he did so voluntarily without exacting from such retailer a contract to
maintain the price of the article sold; (3) that only one contract existed in that
case. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, supra. It is submitted that the reasoning
in the Max Factor case best answers the contention that the Fair Trade Act
is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The fourth objection
that the Act is a denial of the equal protection of the laws in that it gives
producers of trademarked goods an advantage over producers of unidentified
commodities is of no consequence. The principal case answers the objection in
this way: the equal-protection clause does not prevent a state from making a
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation; the Act treats all
persons similarly situated, that is, all producers of branded goods, alike; that
is all that this clause of the Constitution demands. It is submitted that to date
no case has declared the Act unconstitutional on this ground. The fifth objec-
tion is, of course, the most potent. No court denies the power of the legislature
to fix prices of commodities which are affected with a public interest, or where
the regulation is necessary because of public emergency, or where price main-
tenance is a necessary adjunct to the reasonable exrcise of the state's police
power. Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, supra; Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Depart-
ient Stores, Inc., supra. The contention made is that the situation dealt with
in the Fair Trade Act does not come within any of these exceptions, and that
therefore the authorization given by the Act to price regulation is an unconsti-
tutional taking of liberty and property of the defendant retailer without due
process of law. The decisions in the Max Factor case and in the instant case,
both in the state courts and in the United States Supreme Court, clearly nega-
tive this contention. To reiterate the reasoning: the regulation that the Fair
Trade Act permits is justified on the ground that it is within the power of
the legislature to protect the property of the producer of trademarked or
branded goods, that is, the good will and the producer's contract right, and
the price-fixing clause is an appropriate means to that end.
ROBERT J. BUER.
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